Tag Archives: Individual Concepts

Mental Causation

Posted on January 28, 2007 by

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/ 3. From Substance to Property Mind-body causation is problematic for a substance dualist, but it appears to be less so for a materialist, someone who believes that the mind, if it is a substance at all, is a material … Continue reading →

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Identity Theory of Mind

Posted on January 28, 2007 by

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/  The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically we do … Continue reading →

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Unity of Consciousness

Posted on January 20, 2007 by

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/#ConMusUni On the other side, there are theorists who maintain not only that conscious states in a subject are unified but that they must be unified. Bayne and Chalmers (2003, p. 24) call this the unity thesis: necessarily, any set … Continue reading →

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Mysticism

Posted on January 20, 2007 by

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/#1: 1.1 The Wide Sense of Mystical Experience In the wide sense, let us say that a mystical experience is: A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of … Continue reading →

Posted in Individual Concepts, Ineffable, James, Numinous/Mystical Experience | Tagged , , , | 2 Comments

Sense Data

Posted on January 20, 2007 by

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/: Sense data are the (alleged) mind-dependent objects that we are directly aware of in perception, and that have exactly the properties they appear to have. Critics of sense data have objected to the theory’s commitment to mind-body dualism, its … Continue reading →

Posted in Individual Concepts, Sense Data, Specious Present | Tagged , , | 1 Comment

Noesis

Posted on January 18, 2007 by

[Realizing the value of this thing.  I finished the detailed outline/chart of the paper including how many pages each section would take. Looking through the blog reminded that I had left something out] Although I’m just adding another ‘elaborate’ post, … Continue reading →

Posted in Elaborate, Individual Concepts, META, Noesis, Qualia, Sense Data, Specious Time | Tagged , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Individual Concepts

Posted on January 11, 2007 by

Place in meta-may need to link later…or not.   Will need to clarify terms according to the foundational assumptions      Religious Experience vs. Mystical Experience  Flow Experience  Sense Data  Specious Time Qualia  Sections under PhD,  will work on them from … Continue reading →

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